Abstract-Variations in the RF chain of radio transmitters caused by imperfections of manufacturing processes can be used as a signature to uniquely associate wireless devices with a given transmission. In our previous work, we proposed a model-based approach that allows for identification of wireless devices based on signatures obtained with time domain analysis of a pair of received and decoded signals. Here, we consider strong adversaries who intentionally introduce distortions to the data symbols before the symbols are exposed to the transmitter's inherent nonlinearities, with the intention of faking the signatures of their devices while still allowing for proper data decoding. The method proposed in this work is based on spectral analysis and on the observation that nonlinear components cause in-band distortion and spectral regrowth of the signal that is dependent on the parameters of the nonlinearity. Hence, by analysis of the in-band distortion of the spectrum as well as the spectral regrowth, we show that wireless devices can be successfully identified even when the users are digitally modifying their data symbols. The utility of the proposed identification approach is demonstrated with simulations based on parameters obtained from the measurements of commercially employed WLAN RF transmitters Index Terms-Radiometric identification, likelihood ratio test, wireless security, process variations.
APs, as the IP addresses are assigned to users only temporarily and can be reused after the connections are terminated. Media access control (MAC) addresses of network interface cards, tagging wireless devices, although globally unique, can be easily reconfigured by the users. In addition, the robustness of cryptographic identification methods is a concern, because of their inherent vulnerability to hacking attacks.
All of these factors imply an urgent need for the development of new, device tagging techniques that will focus on an extraction of characteristics of mobile devices from the physical-layer information. These characteristics then become unique, consistent and trackable fingerprints that are hard to alter by the users and can be used to identify the wireless transmitters. Identifying the source of an emitted signal is a long existing research topic, especially in military applications, where finding the source of a radar signal is of high interest [4] , [5] . Recent, rapid progress of wireless communication technologies, with their inherent security threats due to the shared medium, has amplified the importance of radiometric identification of wireless transmitters.
Exploitation of the physical-layer for the purpose of device identification in wireless communication systems has recently been considered as an alternative to utilization of information available at higher layers of the protocol stack. Exploitation of imperfections of hardware caused by inaccuracies of production processes is especially attractive for identification purposes, because it makes identification independent from the location of wireless users, as opposed to the methods based on channel properties [6] [7] [8] [9] that require a strong assumption on users' stationarity. Physical-layer identification techniques that exploit hardware imperfections can generally be divided into two groups: transient signal techniques [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] and steady state signal techniques [1] , [2] , [18] [19] [20] [21] . A transient is a radio emission generated while the power of the output of an radio frequency (RF) transmitter goes from zero to the level required for data communication. Because of brief durations and the high degree of irregularity of the transients, high sampling rates are required for transient feature extraction. Also, accurate estimation of the start and end times of the transients is challenging. Recently, device identification techniques based on the analysis of slight variations of steady state, modulated signals have been proposed [1] , [2] , [18] [19] [20] [21] Brik et al. [18] and later Candore et al. [20] used machine learning techniques on collected modulation data to train classifiers that are then able to distinguish wireless cards. In [1] , [2] we introduced a model-based approach that provides very good identification performance and allows for verifiable accuracy of the identification decisions.
All of the RF fingerprinting techniques based on steady state signal analysis exploit the fact that nonideal transmitters cause signal distortions that, while being slight enough for the transmitters to meet requirements of the communication standards, are significant enough to make the distortions observable and able to be tied with an individual transmitter. Therefore, an adversary user, who is capable of modification of the higherlayer tags such as the IP address and MAC address, can be successfully identified based on its physical-layer fingerprint. However, a strong adversary, aware of the fingerprinting methods, could inject slight distortions to the digital data signal before the signal is exposed to the transmitter's nonlinearities, on which the RF fingerprint is based. This slight, artificial distortion while still allowing for reliable data transmission (see Section V), would change the character of the total distortion observable at the receiver over time, and hence the character of the fingerprint, which would significantly degrade performance of the steady state signal based methods [1] , [2] , [18] . In particular in [22] authors report thwarting the identification methods of Brik et al. [18] , with success rate close to 100%, with a simple adjustment of the carrier frequency of the masquerading device and with digital shrinking/expanding of the constellation symbols' positions.
In this work we propose a post-crime mobile device identification method which involves the testing of devices from a pool of suspects in order to decide which one was most likely used while the crime was committed, when high-layer identification mechanisms fail or are not implemented, and when the strong adversary injects slight, artificial distortion to the digital data signal in order to fake its physical-layer signature. The only print from the crime scene is a signal record captured from the wireless transmitter by an access point. Having this record and records from a group of devices that have been potentially used to commit the crime, captured using the same access point, the proposed method can be used to successfully indicate the offender's device. Our method exploits the fact that power amplifiers (PAs), which seek to have linear characteristics, are often quite nonlinear even with significant compensation. What is important for the identification is that the nonlinearities can vary significantly across individual units. Although a transmitted signal is nonlinearly distorted by other elements of the transmitter chain as well, it is well-known in practice that the PA nonlinearity dominates the RF chain [23] , and we ourselves have established that it dominates the digitalto-analog (D/A) converter [2] . It is important to stress here that we only exploit the differences in the nonlinear character of the power amplifiers. Differences of values of the linear gain that could be masked by varying the distance between transmitter and receiver or fading effects of the channel are ignored. Thus, we normalize all captured signals to the same gain value G = 1 to prevent the exploitation of gain for identification.
The method proposed here is based on the observation that the nonlinearity of the radio frequency power amplifiers, which are the last elements of the transmitter chain and thus cannot be influenced by software modifications, cause slight in-band distortion and spectral regrowth of the signal that is dependent on the parameters of the amplifier's nonlinearity. We demonstrate that this distortion can be isolated from a potential, additional cause of spectral modification of the waveform: modification of the digital data symbols by the strong adversary. Hence, with oversampling of the captured signals at the receiver, the mobile devices can be identified even if the masquerading users fake their RF signatures by injecting artificial distortions to the data symbols while committing the crime.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the formal problem statement. An expression for the signal power spectral density (psd) that allows for separation of the two possible causes for spectrum modification: digital symbol distortion and PA nonlinearity, is described in Section III. Section IV introduces the proposed identification method. Numerical results that verify the utility of the proposed method are presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The strong adversary considered in this work has the capability to intentionally distort the digital data by taking the digital symbols off the signal constellation grid, before they are pulse-shaped and exposed to the PA's nonlinearity. When such a distortion is employed, the correctly detected data symbols, chosen at the receiver as elements of the constellation, differ from the symbols at the transmitter directly before the pulse-shaping and the exposure to the PA nonlinearities. This intentional distortion, while causing only slight signal quality degradation (see Section V), causes significant degradation of the identification methods from [1] and [2] , which makes the attack very attractive for the strong adversary. In particular, in [1] and [2] we assumed that for the PA, which dominates the transmitter's nonlinearity, the input samples are accessible, as they can be reconstructed from the correctly decoded data at the receiver if the rest of the transmitter chain is assumed linear. We then used time-domain analysis of the decoded data and the received signal for the identification decisions. Here, we address a scenario when the input to the transmitter's PA can be different from the input reconstructed at the receiver because of slight distortions that the strong adversary could have injected to the digital symbols, in addition to inherent waveform distortions caused by the PA impairments. Such injection might allow the strong adversary to fake the RF signature of its device, while still allowing for correct data decoding. Therefore, in this work we develop an identification method that allows for separation of the two possible sources of distortion: modification of the digital data symbols by a strong adversary and inherent transmitter nonlinearities, thus allowing for successful identification of the devices used by the strong adversaries. The identification approach studied here assumes that the properties of the pulse-shaping filter are known and cannot be modified by the adversary. However, since the pulseshaping is a linear operation, the concept of isolating the transmitter's inherent nonlinearity from the linear sources of the spectral distortion, which is exploited in this work, holds also when the character of the pulse-shaping filter is unknown. Fig. 1 . The K-device identification scenario: short record captured at a crime scene from a device used by the strong adversary that is capable of artificial distortion of the data symbols applied in order to fake RF signature of the device (upper part); post-crime records captured from K devices building a pool of suspects (lower part). An additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel model is assumed. Fig. 1 presents the post-crime identification scenario considered in this work. A signal record is captured by a receiver from the criminal's device at the crime scene when the strong adversary either does or does not distort the digital symbols in order to fake the device's RF signature. After the crime is committed, using the same receiver, records are captured from a group of devices that might have been used to commit the crime. The goal of this work is to tie transmissions from the crime scene to other transmissions from that same device. The ability to indicate a device that was used to commit the crime can then allow law enforcement to reduce the size of the original group of suspect devices and to justify applications for device confiscation warrants that can then lead to final identification decisions and possible arrests based on the digital content of the devices. The considered identification scenario is analogous to classical ballistics testing used for crimes involving the discharge of a weapon.
Our method is based on an assumption that only short transmissions are available from the crime scene captured at times when the strong adversary might or might have not injected distortions to the data symbols. But the records from the devices that are building the pool of suspects are captured at times when the users do not distort the data signals, and these devices can be observed for a long enough time to obtain relatively accurate estimates of their true RF signatures. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption, since the digital data distortion does cause slight signal quality degradation (see Section V) and thus device performance degradation that the strong adversary is not expected to tolerate over an extended period of time. This is analogous to a criminal taking an uncomfortable mask off some time after he masqueraded to commit the crime. In this work we consider a scenario where the strong adversaries are capable of changing the character of the distortion applied to each packet individually. Hence, only a single packet is available to be used to detect and characterize the potential artificial distortion and to correct for it.
III. MODELING THE SPECTRUM OF THE OUTPUT
OF THE NONLINEAR RF POWER AMPLIFIER Behavioral modeling of RF power amplifiers is an extensive research area that concentrates on the extraction of low complexity models for system simulations that accurately capture the performance impairments and distortions caused by circuit level effects. Among various models that have been considered to model the behaviour of the PAs are polynomial memoryless models, two-box Hammerstein and Wiener models, multiplebox models, Volterra series based models and neural network based models. Piecewise modeling approaches have also been considered. A variety of survey papers and books provide a rich overview of the existing behavioral modeling approaches e.g., [24] [25] [26] . In this work we are considering low order, memoryless polynomial behavioral models, which as reported by Isaksson et al. in [25] , allow for high modelling accuracy even for wide-band signals (up to 20 MHz baseband). The extension to more complex models is possible, but leads to an increase in complexity of the PA output spectrum model introduced in (7) .
Consider a communication signal modeled with a random process
where p(t) is an analog pulse and a n 's are data symbols, which for commonly used digital modulation schemes are modeled as identically distributed, uncorrelated, zero-mean complex random variables, for which the distribution depends on the digital modulation scheme. The waveform x(t) is not a wide-sense stationary, but a cyclostationary random process, as its expected value is zero and its autocorrelation function is periodic in T s . Thus, instead of using the Wiener-Khinchin theorem, we consider the more general definition of power spectral density (psd) in order to describe the spectrum of the signal captured from the device that needs to be identified. Consider an arbitrary random process x (t). Its power spectral density can be expressed as
where
and
the Fourier transform of x T (t).
On the transmitter side the cyclostationary communication process x(t) from (1) is amplified with a nonlinear amplifier, the characteristic of which can be accurately modeled with an odd-order polynomial with coefficients {h 2p−1 , p = 1, 2, . . . , P} [25] . The resultant process y(t) can be expressed as
Define
With (2) the power spectral density of the random process y(t), after being sent through an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, can then be expressed as
where σ 2 ν is the power spectral density of an AWGN process ν(t). With (4), (5), and (6), and the linearity of expectation and the Fourier transform, the power spectral density of y(t) can be expressed as
Because the a n s are identically distributed, uncorrelated and zero-mean random variables, (7) simplifies significantly, as the expected value E a n 1
inside of the multiple sum takes non-zero values only when among all (2p 1 − 1) + (2p 2 − 1) sum indices n, all subsets of indices that take the same values have size that is an even number. In all other cases, because of the uncorrelated and zero-mean property of the a n s, the expected value can be written as a product of factors, at least one of which is equal to zero. Therefore, for a known pulse-shaping filter, the power spectral density (7) can be simplified and expressed as a function of even-order central moments (pg. 86 of Section 2.4 [27] ) of the, potentially digitally distorted, random variables a n , and of the coefficients of the nonlinearity of the amplifier. For a 5th order, real, odd polynomial representation of the PA's input/output (I/O) characteristic (P = 3 in (7)), (7) can be reduced to
where μ j , j = 1, 2, . . . , J is the jth central moment of a n , and the R l ( f ) s are functions that only depend on the pulse p(t) used for pulse-shaping and can be found as sums of products of Fourier transforms of products of time shifted pulses p(t). For example Although N → ∞ in (7) and (9), in practice these sums are finite, because practical pulses have finite lengths and their shifted versions overlap only up to a given finite relative time shift. Fig. 2 shows the R l ( f ) functions from (8) for l = 1, 2, . . . , 18, for a raised-cosine pulse-shaping filter with rolloff factor r = 0.5. Function R 19 ( f ) has not been plotted because of the extensive time required for its calculation. Eq. (8) then shows how the psd of a received waveform changes with the change of the moments of the data symbols that can be caused by potential distortions intentionally injected to the data symbols by the strong adversary. As we will show in the numerical results of Section V, very good performance of the proposed identification method is obtained even if the first 18 out of the 19 R l ( f ) functions are used to calculate the psd model (8) , as the contribution of R l ( f ) decreases with increasing index l. Model (8) was derived for a low-order polynomial PA model (4) with real coefficients h. The extension of (8) to low-order, complex polynomial PA models, which according to [25] allow for good accuracy of modeling practical RF amplifiers, as well as extension to other practical PA models [25] is possible at the expense of complexity in (8) .
IV. PROPOSED IDENTIFICATION METHOD

A. Hypothesis Test
Assume that we collect D observations of the signal y(t) given in (5) . Denote these signals, each of duration 2NT s , as 
Because the hypotheses are equally probable, for uniform Bayesian costs, a threshold that minimizes the risk of the test is τ = 1 (pg. 26 of Section 2.2 [30] ). The two-device scenario can easily be generalized to a K-device scenario, for which the identified device k is the device for which the likelihood function takes maximal value:
For the more general case of the averaged periodogram, the likelihood functions, calculated as a joint distribution of a set of frequency domain, independent, Gamma distributed random variables are
where D is a shape parameter of the Gamma distribution (equal to the number of averaged periodograms), and k ( f n ) is a scale parameter of the Gamma distribution at the frequency f n ; under hypothesis
where With (14), because of the monotonicity of the logarithm, and with (D) not dependent on k, the likelihood test (13) can be rewritten as
Typically the true psd values S y,k ( f n ) from (15) are not available and their accurate estimatesS y,k ( f n ),obtained from the long records collected from the pool of suspects when they are not distorting their data symbols, are used to calculate the likelihood functions (16) .
B. Correction of Hypothesis Test True Values for Identification of a Strong Adversary
The K-ary likelihood test (16) provides good performance only if the adversary does not inject distortions to its data symbols while committing the crime. If the masquerading user modifies moments of its data symbols, the performance of the test in (16) can degrade significantly, as will be shown in Section V. However, with the model from (8), it is possible to take into account changes of the psd caused by moments' modifications and accordingly correct the valuesS y,k ( f n ) used in (16) for device k. For device k, we require estimates of:
1) The moments μ j,k , j = 1, 2, . . . , J, where μ j,k is the jth central moment for the kth device when the user is not distorting their data symbols. 2) The moments μ j , j = 1, 2, . . . , J, where μ j is the jth central moment of the data symbols from the device that was used to commit the crime.
Consider first the easier problem of determining the moments μ j,k , j = 1, 2, . . . , J, of the data symbols from captures of the device k while building the pool of suspects. For j = 1, 2, . . . , J, let μ j,k be the estimate of μ j,k . For the devices from the pool of suspects, unmodified decoded input data symbols are easily accessible, and hence these moments can be estimated very accurately.
Next, consider the more difficult problem of determining the moments μ j , j = 1, 2, . . . , J for the capture from the crime scene. Since, because of the intentional distortion, the correctly decoded data symbols are not necessarily identical to the data symbols generated at the transmitter, we cannot estimate the moments of the data symbols based on the decoded data. Thus, for each device k in the pool of suspects, we generate estimates μ j,k , j = 1, 2, . . . , J of the moments to use when hypothesis k is being tested, as follows. Recall that, under hypothesis k, the nonlinear I/O characteristic can be accurately estimated from the I/O data collected from devices while building the pool of suspects. Hence, rather than employing the decoded data, we apply the inverse of the nonlinear I/O characteristics of amplifier k to the received data to get an estimate of the power amplifier input. These estimates of the power amplifier input can then be readily employed to generate the necessary moments μ j,k , j = 1, 2, . . . , J for device k.
These two sets of moments, one corresponding to when the data is not distorted and one corresponding to when the data is distorted, for device k can then be used to calculate the corrected estimatesS C y,k ( f n ) of the psd and the corresponding corrected scale parameters˜
Recall thatS y,k ( f n ) in (17) is the psd estimated accurately for device k when the user was not distorting the data symbols, S y is the model from (8) , and μ j,k , j = 1, 2, . . . , J and μ j,k , j = 1, 2, . . . , J are the moment estimates whose calculation is discussed in detail above.
To help illustrate the complicated correction procedure above, let's consider four different cases. Recall that, to test a given hypothesis,S y,k ( f n ) from (17) is taken as the true value of the power spectral density of a signal transmitted by the device when the digital data symbols are not modified, and S C y,k ( f n ) is taken as the true power spectral density for captures from the adversary device, where the data symbols have been intentionally distorted. Four different cases are possible: 1) Hypothesis H k is correct (kth device is the adversary's device) and the adversary was not distorting the digital data symbols while committing the crime. 2) Hypothesis H k is correct (kth device is the adversary's device) and the adversary was distorting the digital data symbols while committing the crime. 3) Hypothesis H k is not correct (kth device is not the adversary's device) and the adversary was not distorting the digital data symbols while committing the crime. 4) Hypothesis H k is not correct (kth device is the not adversary's device) and the adversary was distorting the digital data symbols while committing the crime.
In the case 1), the correct polynomial inverse function is applied to the captured record, and, since the digital symbols were not modified by the adversary, μ j,k ≈ μ j,k , j = 2, 4,6,8,10. Hence no correction is applied andS
In the case 2), the correct polynomial inverse function is applied to the captured record and the estimated moments μ j,k differ from μ j,k , i = 2,4,6,8,10.S C y,k ( f n ) correctly takes into account the changes caused by modifications of the moments. In cases 3) and 4), the incorrect polynomial inverse function is applied to the captured record, and the moments of the signal from the crime scene are estimated incorrectly.S C y,k ( f n ) from (15) is then different than the power spectral density of the capture from the adversary, and therefore the hypothesis has a very small chance to be selected as the test's outcome.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed scheme for postincident identification of devices used by strong adversaries. Since (8) is a nonlinear function of the central moments, the correction needs to be applied at rates greater than that at which the strong adversary is capable of changing the distortion characteristics. Although it is likely that the adversary would employ a fixed distortion across an entire session in order to try to mimic another device, in this work we assume a scenario where the strong adversary can change the character of the distortion applied to the data symbols for each individual packet. Hence the correction needs to be applied to each received packet individually, and thus the moment estimates used for the correction are obtained from a single packet only. If the adversary changes the character of the distortion at a lower rate, that can only increase the accuracy of the moment estimates and thus increase the performance of the proposed identification method, reported in the following Section V.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To investigate the performance of the proposed identification device method, we first generate polynomial representations of PA I/O characteristics artificially. Next, and most importantly, we obtain polynomial representations for actual RF power amplifiers by measurements, and we analyze the performance of the identification method at input power levels specified as linear by the manufacturer.
Consider first the artificial generation of amplifier polynomial representations and a 3-hypotheses scenario, where each amplifier was modeled with a real 5th order odd polynomial coefficient vector. The first of the three coefficient vectors was
The second and third vectors were then generated as a sum of the vector h 1 and respective random vectors:
where η i,j are independent, zero-mean, normal random variables with standard deviation σ η . The input data signal to the power amplifiers was modeled as a sequence of realizations of a zero-mean, normal random variable with standard deviation σ x , clipped to the level C, and pulse-shaped with a raisedcosine pulse-shaping filter with a roll-off factor r = 0.5. The oversampling ratio O of the pulse-shaping filter was set to O = 4. The clipping level C was set to the 1 dB input compression point (defined as the input value corresponding to where the output curve is 1 dB below that of the ideal linear I/O characteristic) of the amplifier modeled with the coefficient vector h.σ x was chosen such that 99% of the data symbols were below the clipping level C. We used the first 18 out of the 19 R l functions to calculate the psd model (8) . N DFT from (14) was set to N DFT = 4096. We used the frequency interval [0.76 · f s , 0.91 · f s ] to calculate the likelihood functions (14) , as the high variance of the periodogram at frequencies lower than 0.76 · f s caused degradation of the test performance. Also, for frequencies higher than 0.91 · f s , for the considered pulseshaping filter, the regrowth caused by the PA nonlinearity was very small and thus including these freq\uencies did not bring performance improvements. Fig. 3 shows the probability of error, calculated over 250 randomly generated groups of 3 power amplifiers and input signals, as a function of the standard deviation σ η of the zeromean, normal random variable η (18), for signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) equal to 30 dB, for 50 signal records of length 1024 symbols, captured from the device when the crime was committed, Fig. 3 . Probability of erroneous identification decision calculated over 250 randomly generated groups of 3 power amplifiers and input signals, as a function of standard deviation σ η of the zero-mean, normal random variable η (18), for SNR = 30 dB, for 50 signal records of length 1024 symbols, captured from the device used to commit a crime, and for 500 signal records of length 1024 undistorted symbols captured from the three suspected devices, for the identification methods and scenarios summarized in Table I.   TABLE I  SUMMARY OF THE CONSIDERED IDENTIFICATION  SCENARIOS AND METHODS and for 500 signal records of length 1024 undistorted symbols captured from the three suspected devices, for the scenarios and identification methods summarized in Table I . The modification of data symbols (Scenario 2 from Table I ) resulted in a degradation of EVM = P error P reference · 100% by 5.51% (averaged over 10 000 trials). Such EVM degradation for common modulation schemes at common SNR levels should not lead to a significant increase of the bit error rates ([31, Table IV ]), which establishes the possibility and attractiveness of the strong adversary attack model introduced in this work. Fig. 4 shows the probability of error calculated over 250 randomly generated groups of 3 power amplifiers and input signals, as a function of SNR, for standard deviation σ η = 0.3 of the zero-mean, normal random variable η (18), for 50 signal records of length 1024 symbols, captured from the device when the crime was committed, and for 500 signal records of length 1024 undistorted symbols captured from the two suspected devices, for the identification scenarios and methods summarized in Table I . Fig. 4 . Probability of erroneous identification decision, calculated over 250 randomly generated groups of 3 power amplifiers and input signals, as a function of SNR (controlled with the noise power level), for standard deviation σ η = 0.3 of the zero-mean, normal random variable η (18), for 50 signal records of length 1024 symbols, captured from the device used to commit a crime, and for 500 signal records of length 1024 undistorted symbols captured from the three suspected devices, for the identification methods and scenarios summarized in Table I . Fig. 5 . Probability of erroneous identification decision, calculated over 250 randomly generated groups of 3 power amplifiers and input signals, as a function of number of signal records of length 1024 symbols captured from the device used to commit a crime, for SNR = 30 dB, for standard deviation σ η = 0.3 of the zero-mean, normal random variable η (18) , and for 100 signal records of length 1024 undistorted symbols captured from the three suspected devices, for the identification methods and scenarios summarized in Table I. Figs. 5 and 6 show performance of the identification methods from Table I for fixed values of the SNR and σ η as a function of, respectively, the number of records captured from the criminal's device and the number of records captured from the devices building the pool of suspects.
Note that the identification method introduced in this work can be successfully applied regardless of what function the adversary chooses to distort the digital data symbols. The 3rd order polynomial distortion from Table I is merely an example and can be replaced with an arbitrary function without violating the concept of the proposed method.
The functions R i ( f ), i = 1, . . . , 18, visualized in Fig. 2 , are independent from the choice of the function used to modify the digital data symbols. They correspond to the PA model, which Fig. 6 . Probability of erroneous identification decision, calculated over 250 randomly generated power amplifiers and input signals, as a function of number of signal records of length 1024 undistorted symbols captured from the three suspected devices, for SNR = 30 dB, for standard deviation σ η = 0.3 of the zero-mean, normal random variable η (18) , and for 50 signal records of length 1024 symbols captured from the device used to commit a crime, for the identification methods and scenarios summarized in Table I. in our work was chosen as a 5th order odd polynomial. Such a model is a good tradeoff between simplicity and accuracy [24] [25] [26] . With the power amplifier model in place, the power spectral density model (8) was derived. From (8) one can clearly see that the contributions of individual functions R i ( f ) to the spectral regrowth depend on the values of the polynomial coefficients h and the central moments μ. These three aspects: character of the nonlinearity, character of the input signal and the functions R i ( f ) need to be taken into consideration together to model the spectral regrowth.
Figs. 3, 4, 5, and 6 show that if the method proposed in this work is not employed, in the case of the considered 3-hypotheses scenario, the strong adversary is able to successfully fake the RF signature of its device by applying a simple nonlinear function to its data symbols. Spoofing via data symbol distortion is, however, not a trivial task, as it is not straightforward to obtain the functions that, when applied to the data symbols, would modify the moments properly when the characteristics of the victims are unknown. The search for effective techniques that would give criminals the capability of faking the RF signatures of their devices via slight modifications of the data symbols is an interesting topic for future research. The method introduced in this work allows for the successful identification of the devices even if the adversary user had such a capability.
To be able to verify the utility of the proposed identification method, insight on the variations of the I/O characteristics of amplifiers used in practical applications is needed. To obtain such insight, we used a 12.5 GHz, 50 GSa/s Tektronix DPO71254B oscilloscope and measured multiple points of the single tone, amplitude I/O characteristics of eight commercial WLAN amplifiers of the same model: SKYWORKS SKY65006 [32] loaded on evaluation boards, operating at a frequency f = 2.45 GHz. The obtained measurement points were used to approximate the amplitude I/O characteristics with 5th order, odd polynomials. These approximated characteristics SUMMARIZED IN TABLE I were then used to generate amplified data in MATLAB. Similarly as in the case of the artificially generated amplifiers, the input signal was modeled as a sequence of realizations of a zero-mean, normal random variable with standard deviation σ x , clipped to the level C, and pulse-shaped with a raised-cosine pulse-shaping filter with a roll-off factor r = 0.5. The oversampling ratio O of the pulse-shaping filter was set to O = 4.
The clipping level C = 0.1412 of the input signal to the PAs was set to the upper boundary of the range specified as 802.11 b frequency mask-compliant for the considered amplifiers [32] . The standard deviation σ x was chosen such that 99% of the symbols were below the clipping level C (σ x = 0.055). The number of undistorted signal records of length 4096 symbols captured from the devices building the pool of suspects was set to 10 000. The number of signal records of length 4096 symbols captured from the device committing the crime was set to 500. N DFT from (14) was set to 4096. The K-ary test (16) was used to identify each of the eight measured amplifiers. Again identification methods and scenarios from Table I were considered. Similarly, as in the case of the artificially generated amplifiers, we used the frequency interval: [0.76 · f s , 0.91 · f s ] to calculate the likelihood functions (14) and the first 18 out of the 19 R l functions were used to calculate the psd model (8) . Tables II, III , and IV, for SNR values of 30 dB, 35 dB, and 40 dB respectively, show the probability of erroneous identification decision calculated over 250 trials for the identification methods and scenarios from Table I , for eight measured amplifiers. These tables show that while users of devices 3, 6, 7, and 8 were not very successful at faking their devices' RF signatures by distorting the data symbols, the degradation of the performance of the uncorrected (16) was significant when users of devices 1, 2, 4 or 5 were distorting their data, especially at high SNRs. Correction of the scale factors from the test (16) allowed for highly probable identification of these strong adversaries for the considered high SNR values, which based on measurements reported from existing WLAN deployments are reasonable for indoor short-range scenarios. The work presented in this paper is an extension of work presented in [2] to a scenario where the user fakes its RF signature with data symbol distortion. In [2] we provide a comparative overview of related steady state identification techniques. As we stress in [2] , such a comparison is hard to conduct as approaches similar to the model based identification approach that we introduced have not yet been investigated as to the best of our knowledge. Hence in [2] , we are necessarily limited to restating the experimental outcomes of related steady state identification studies, but, since these studies are largely empirical, we are only able to compare them quite roughly to the results from [2] . Thus, here we are forced to limit ourselves to the comparison to the identification methods from [2] , and show significant performance improvements (Figs. 3, 4 , 5, and 6 and Tables II, III, and IV) VI. CONCLUSION In this work, we considered the novel problem of wireless device identification for the case when the strong adversaries actively fake their device's RF signature with artificial injection of a slight distortion to the digital data symbols. While this is unlikely for a standard adversary employing a wireless card, its potential use by strong adversaries motivates the consideration of techniques to address such. Our identification method does not require strict assumptions on the distribution of the data symbols. It is only assumed that elements of the data symbol stream are uncorrelated and have zero mean values. As shown with simulations based on parameters of commercially employed PAs, for high SNR values the application of the proposed method allows for the prevention of the performance degradation caused by modification of the data symbols by the strong adversaries, as identification results are similar to those when adversaries are not sophisticated enough to modify the data. Because of the high data rates of modern communications networks, the data records that need to be captured to perform identification correspond to short observation times of the masquerading users. Because of the fast stabilization of the operating temperature of the measured SKYWORKS PAs [32] , temperature variations were ignored in the presented investigation. Refinement of the algorithms by taking into consideration these variations will however be considered in future research.
